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PRICE STABILIZATION, 1950-1952:
RETROSPECT AND PROSPECT
By DAVID GINSBURG t
"Price and other controls are often opposed out
of fear that such measures will concentrate power
in the Government and threaten our freedom. By
inclination I, too, am opposed to Government con-
trols. But the gravest threats to the preservation of
the American system today are not Government
controls. They are military defeat abroad and fur-
ther inflation at home."
B. M. Baruch'
This article is concerned with some of the difficulties of preventing
inflation and stabilizing prices in a time of rearmament for a limited
emergency of unlimited duration. It deals particularly with one mis-
take and one-perplexing problem.
The period immediately following Korea is used to demonstrate
that efforts to increase production and indirect controls (measures
designed to limit demand by higher taxes, more savings, restrictions
on credit and the supply of money, and reduced government and private
non-defense spending), although basic to the attack on inflation, must,
when the emergency strikes, be supported immediately or even pre-
ceded by direct controls over prices and wages. The mistake, there-
fore, is the failure of the Government to use price and wage controls
early enough to prevent harmful and unnecessary price increases in
the Fall of 1950. The problem is to determine what kind of direct
controls, if any, are needed for a continuing but partial mobilization.
The major underlying assumption is that the danger of further
aggression from the Soviet Union will not abate soon.
I
Rapidly rising prices and living costs are fever signs in mobiliza-
tion. Those who produce military goods are paid for their work in
wages, salaries and profits. The added dollars, if they are not saved,
are sent to market to buy civilian goods and services the supply of
t General Counsel, Office of Price Administration and predecessor agencies, 1940-
1943; Deputy Director, Economics Division, Office of Military Government in
Germany. Member of the Washington, D.C., bar. Author of Legal Aspects of Price
Control in the Defense Program, 27 A.B.AJ. 527 (1941); The Emergency Price
Control Act of 1942: Basic Authority and Sanctions, 9 LAw & CONTEmP. PROB.
22 (1942).
1. Hearings before Committee on Banking and Currency on S. 3936, 81st Cong,
2d Sess. 99 (1950).
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which has been reduced in order to satisfy defense needs. There is
more money to spend than there are goods to buy.
Unless the mobilization is so leisurely as hardly to deserve the
name, the obvious cure-to increase the production of items in short
supply-is impractical; the resources even of our own cofintry are
limited.' In the present mobilization nothing we could do in the near
future to increase the supply of civilian goods and services could
eliminate the "inflationary gap" between supply and demand.3 The
danger of the gap is that prices will be "pulled" up by the bidding of
buyers against each other for a limited supply of goods. When this
happens wage-earners may demand and obtain higher pay in order
to maintain their living standards. Prices will then be "pushed" up
as a consequence of the pressure of wage and other cost increases so
large that they cannot be absorbed through greater efficiency or lower
profit margins.4  Higher wages also increase purchasing power. The
2. The Director of Defense Mobilization, Mr. Charles E. Wilson, has com-
mented on the point in these terms:
"I have also been asked why I, a strong advocate of ever more and better
production, have not come out for more production as the answer to inflation.
The argument is that if we produce more to meet the rising demand, the sup-
plies .will suffice to meet the requirements, and there would be no pressure in
prices.
That argument holds water in normal times, but it's a sieve in abnormal times.
We simply do not have ewugh -materials to permit all-out prodiction of durable
cizlia goods at the same time that we are striving to produce tanks, planes, and
gins in sufficient numbers to deter Russia from an attack.
I have, however, supported additional production of basic materials such as
steel, copper, and aluminum, as well as many other materials, as one means of
meeting defense needs without too great a drain on the civilian economy. We
are already beginning to achieve noteworthy increases in such production.
But this is a far cry from supporting all out production of durable civilian
goods such as automobiles, refrigerators, TV sets and the like. Increased pro-
duction in such lines is not the answer simply because it's impossible."
Charles E. Wilson, "I Hate Controls But We Need Them Now", N. Y. Times Maga-
zine Section, August 26, 1951.
3. DIRECTOR OF DEFENSE MOBILIZATION, FIRST QUARTERLY REPORT To THE
PREsIDENT 4 (April 1, 1951). The term "inflationary gap" is often encountered in
discussions of economic stabilization. In its simplest conception it describes the ex-
cess of cash income available to consumers over current production available for pur-
chase by consumers at existing price levels. "Inflationary pressures have a simple
origin-more money seeking goods than there are goods to buy. The excess of de-
mand over supply is the 'inflationary gap."' DIRECTOR OF DEFENSE MOBILIZATION,
SECOND QUARTERLY REPORT TO THE PRESIDENT 33 (July 1, 1951).
Roy Harrod demonstrated that the formula for measuring the amount of the
inflationary gap comes to this: ". . . the excess of governmental expenditures and
capital expenditures-taken together-over the amounts of money paid in taxes and
the amounts of money normally saved, taken together." N. Y. Times, October 7, 1951,
Magazine Section, "Inflation; A Primer for Today." Forecasts of the amount of
inflationary gap are subject to correction to the extent that assumed expenditures
and tax payments are different from the amounts actually expended and collected.
The conception is primarily useful as a rough yardstick for measuring anticipated
inflationary pressures in some future period. When that period has passed it will,
of course, appear that the gap was bridged, in part, by price increases and, for the
rest, by savings.
4. HART, DEFENSE WITHOUT INFLATION 59 (1951).
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reciprocal interaction of prices and wages-the price-wage spiral-
can be started either by price increases which raise the cost of living
and lead to wage increases, or by wage increases which raise the costs
of production and lead to price increases. The greatest single danger
from donmestic sources which confronts the country today is the danger
of spiraling inflation.
If fixed prices were the final object of government policy it would
be simple to establish a controls program (although difficult to main-
tain it). But an unyielding price structure is not an end in itself.
In mobilization, wd seek substantial price stability, not absolute price
inflexibility. We need stability for at least three reasons: to provide
the most favorable conditions for defense production; to assure that
the rewards and sacrifices of mobilization are distributed fairly; and
to prevent avoidable increases in the permanent structure of costs,
wages and prices.
The compelling need for increased defense production requires
that doctrinaire adherence to an excessively rigid price and wage
policy should not be allowed to disrupt that production or to destroy
production incentives. By the same token a government in mobiliza-
tion cannot tolerate the disorganization of markets and demoralization
of workers caused by spurting price increases. Production which may
be needed for survival flourishes only in an economic atmosphere in
which buyers and sellers can plan future costs and prices with a measure
of confidence. For this reason, in mobilization, controls over inven-
tories, production and distribution, through priorities, allocations and
related supply controls, must replace the free price or market system
as the means for rechanneling material resources to defense purposes.
The job cannot, with safety, be done otherwise. Goods and services
needed for defense must go not to the highest bidder but where they
are most needed. Priorities and allocation powers are essential. With-
out price stability these powers could not be effectively invoked.
Equity in the allocation of the rewards and sacrifices of mobiliza-
tion is a fundamental objective which is translated into specific policies
only with very great difficulty. There are no exact economic guides
to equity unless, arbitrarily, they are derived from past relationships.
In a mobilization designed for the long-pull (or what we are begin-
ning to normalize by the softer phrase "defense economy") historic
standards of equity rapidly lose their relevance, and equity comes to
mean, in practice, a working balance among group interests, business,
labor and agriculture, all of whose elements are persuaded that the
balance is fair.
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Finally, unless the cost of living is stabilized, wages and produc-
tion costs are bound to rise; and as the wage-price spiral accelerates,
faith in the government's power and leadership is undermined. The
entire economy, not the stabilization program alone, is then placed in
jeopardy by loss of public confidence in the value of liquid assets and
a mass flight from accumulated dollars into goods.
The risk of a runaway inflation is obviously greater if spiraling
begins from a level already regarded as high.
II
In the seven months between June 25, 1950, and January 26,
1951-between the invasion of South Korea and the beginning of
general price and wage control-the cost of living rose, on the average,
nearly 1% per month; wholesale prices more than 2% per month; the
prices of 28 sensitive primary market commodities (agricultural and
industrial) more than 6% per month. Why did the Government
delay so long before trying to stop the upward march by direct price
control ?
The price and wage increases which took place during these
months are now imbedded, perhaps permanently, in the nation's cost
structure. Would not the bolder policy of a quick temporary general
price and wage ceiling-so long and persuasively advocated by Mr.
Baruch-have been a wiser policy from the viewpoint of the public
interest?
Fully six months before Korea the President and his Council
of Economic Advisers had told the country that the level of prices
was already high enough to be generally profitable at a high level
of activity, and that there was no justification for further broad ad-
vances. 5 Immediately after Korea the Council reviewed what had hap-
pened to the economy since the end of World War I.6 It observed
that in those five years we had experienced five different phases of
business activity, including a bad postwar inflation (climaxed in 1948
by an all-time high in prices), a seven-month recession in 1949, and a
recovery so swift that by January 1950 the Council had been obliged
to warn that "every effort" should be made to avoid further price
increases. Why was this warning ignored in the fall of 1950?
In 1942 the monthly average of the wholesale price index for
all commodities (1926 = 100) had been 98.8. In 1945 it was at
5. CouNCIL OF EcoNoMIc ADvisms, THE ANNUAL ECONOMIC Rmw 99-100
(January 1950).
6. COUNCIL OF ECONOMIC ADvisERs, THE ECONOMIC SITUATION AT MIDYEAR
1950, pp. 25-37.
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105.8. The index in June 1950 was up to 157.3; by March 1951 it had
reached 184.
In 1942 the monthly average of the cost-of-living index (con-
sumers' prices; 1935-39 = 100) had been 116.6. In 1945 it was at
128.6. The index on June 15, 1950, was up to 170.2; by March 15,
1951, it had reached 184.5.
Measured not by index points but in terms of percentages, from
Korea to the beginning of general price and wage controls, wholesale
prices advanced 14.5 % ; sensitive primary market commodities 45.8% ;
and the cost of living 6.6%. On November 15, 1951, the cost of living
was 10.8% above the pre-Korean level.
Coming at a time when the level of business activity in most in-
dustries was high, and the level of prices only slightly below post-war
peaks, the invasion in June 1950 set off a spurt of consumer and busi-
ness buying which resulted almost immediately in abrupt price in-
creases. Before the first wave had fully subsided, the news of the
mass Chinese intervention in late November set off a second wave of
buying which carried prices to new highs in mid-February 1951.
The increased prices exacted during this period were mostly
speculative and unjustified. Demand was financed by accumulated
liquid assets and credit expansion, not by sudden increases in buying
power resulting from defense spending or Government deficits. Con-
sumer goods and services were still in plentiful supply. For nearly
seven months, therefore, businessmen built their inventories and plants,
and consumers manifested in the market their anticipations of future
shortages and price increases-and thus, in large measure, brought
about with their fears the very conditions against which they sought to
insure themselves.
III
Three weeks after the Korean outbreak the President sent a
special message to the Congress outlining an emergency legislative
program to permit industrial mobilization and to curb inflation. He
did not ask for power to control prices and wages.. A week later
the President restated his views in the mid-year economic report to
the Congress. He directed attention to the "marked rise" in prices
(spot index for 28 commodities up 10%, wholesale prices up 3.7%,
the cost of living up 1.4%) but limited his legislative proposals to
higher tax rates (a $5 billion increase) and powers to regulate con-
sumer and mortgage credit, to limit commodity speculation, to issue
priority, allocation and related orders over supplies and facilities, and
to expedite the production of essential goods by Government loans
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and other incentives. Inexplicably, in view of the tenor of his report,
he did not ask for even standby authority to control prices and wages.
The President simply stated that we should rely in major degree upon
fiscal and credit measures and added:
"The more prompt and vigorous we are with these general
measures, the less need there will be for all of the comprehensive
direct controls which involve the consideration of thousands of
individual situations and thus involve infinitely greater admin-
istrative difficulties and much greater interference with individual
choice and initiative." 7
By September 1 the Congress had compromised its differences
on the Defense Production Act of 1950. The final version not only
gave the President most of the production and supply powers he had
sought but in Title IV gave him authority to control prices and wages.
For this unprecedented legislative bonus he was largely indebted to
Mr. Baruch.
It is doubtful, of course, whether every vote for the bill rep-
resented a moral commitment to the principle of price stabilization.
Some probably sought to give the majority party a choice between
responsibility for permitting inflation and the onus of an unpopular
controls apparatus. It may be, too, that the President refrained from
asking for price and wage controls because he believed that in this
way the authority would be granted more readily. All this seems
immaterial. The essential fact is that a reasonably adequate law s
was placed on the books in the record time of something more than six
weeks. For this action the-Congress deserves credit.
Nearly five months passed before those powers were used. For
the consequences of this inaction the Executive must take responsibility.
Meanwhile, all Washington set about as if deliberately to re-
create for the country the mood, the tensions and the anxieties of World
War II. A system of priorities and allocations was promptly estab-
lished-and a more stringent controlled materials plan just as promptly
forecast. Hope was expressed that credit controls and increased tax-
ation would suffice to control inflation-but warnings repeatedly were
broadcast that price controls would be invoked if necessary. Brown-
outs were predicted., Export controls were tightened. Industry com-
mittees were established; anti-trust laws were reexamined. An excess
profits tax law was enacted. The draft was debated. Wholesale prices
reached a new high. A steel shortage was forecast. Government
7. U.S. PRESIDENT, THE MIDYEAR ECONOMIc REPORT 10 (July 1950).
8. See Field, Economic Stabilization under the Defense Production Act of 1950,
64 HARV. L. REv. 1-26 (1950).
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stockpiling was accelerated. Power expansion was called for. An
Economic Stabilization Agency was created. Canada and the United
States joined in plans to coordinate their economies for defense. A
Wage Stabilization Board was organized. The Chairman of the
National Security Resources Board warned that unjustified price in-
creases would be taken into account if and when the Government es-
tablished price controls. Earlier he had said that the country was mov-
ing from a "light grey" mobilization into one of darker hue-and
that the "closer we come to full mobilization the more likely wage
and price controls are." In his maiden address Mr. Alan Valentine,
the first Administrator of the Economic Stabilization Agency (ESA)
stressed the differences between World War II days and the post-
Korean period, emphasizing that direct controls only restrict or post-
pone or conceal the effects of inflation without curing it. "We must
place our first hope in indirect controls which in general must be our
first effort." Michael V. DiSalle, the Mayor of Toledo, became price
administrator; "informed sources" said that this brought direct stabili-
zation action nearer. But the same sources also felt certain that no
direct wage or price control program would be started until a staff had
been recruited. Recruitment was slow.9
It is difficult now to describe the near hysteria of this strange
seven month period. As a nation, we were reacting to the facts of
1950 with the fears and impulses of 1944. We listened to the North
Korean rifle fire on the 38th Parallel-and heard Soviet bombs,
mostly atomic, exploding over Washington and New York. Ec-
onomically, it was blindman's buff after two double martinis. It was
inflation without any substantial increase in defense spending and
despite a more than adequate supply of consumer goods and services.
The formal announcement of the government's intention to impose
mandatory general price and wage controls came December 15, 1950,
in the President's declaration of the existence of a national emergency.
Administrative preparations for this step were made during December
and January."0 As a stop-gap, voluntary restraint was called for and
a set of voluntary pricing standards published. In addition, telegrams
were sent to several hundred leading concerns asking them to cooperate
with the government's stabilization program by not increasing prices
except after seven days notice.
In the President's economic report to the Congress on January 12,
1951, it was made clear that events had overcome official inhibitions.
9. See BNA, Daily Report for Executives, Nos. 139-233 (1950).
10. CouNCIL OF EcoNoMIc ADISERS, THE EcoNoMIc StruATION AT Mmxui
1951, p. 41.
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"We must use direct controls," said the President, "as well as [these]
tax and credit measures in order to deal with the problem of inflation.
. . This will require the broad extension of price and wage controls
to hold down the upward spiral." 11
Wholesale prices generally had by then increased 11% over their
pre-Korean levels and many important items had risen far more than
the average. Chemicals, for example, had risen 21/2 % ; textiles,
24%. The cost of living had already moved up 427o2 over June 1950.
Wage increases, as might be expected, were widespread and substantial.
After September 1950, according to the Council of Economic Advisers,
a "landslide movement developed" for higher wages, accompanied in
some instances by demands for fringe benefits. Increases in wage rates
were often followed by price increases. Price increases encouraged
demands for wage increases.
The first significant action to control prices was not taken until
January 26, 1951, when Mr. DiSalle for the Office of Price Stabiliza-
tion issued the General Ceiling Price Regulation (GCPR). In effect,
this established a ceiling over most commodity prices-the exemptions
related largely to specified farm products-at the highest levels at which
each seller had made deliveries during the five week period from Decem-
ber 19, 1950, through January 25, 1951. A simultaneous parallel
order stopping further increases in wages was issued by the new ESA
Administrator, Mr. Eric Johnston.
By this time any normal balance or relationship among prices and
between prices and wages, over the economy as a whole, had been
utterly destroyed. The cost structure of the country had become a
crazy quilt of prices and wages which reflected the hopes and fears-
the patriotism and the cupidity-of each seller as he reacted to the daily
cascade of rumors, statements, entreaties, and forecasts which had
poured out of Washington during the previous five months. All of
these imbalances and inequities, for the time being at least, were
frozen into a price structure which, from the viewpoint of government
administration, could only be described as a price controller's night-
mare. Sellers and buyers, moreover, were taught an unforgettable
lesson of the kind that Pangloss taught Candide. Sellers who heeded
their government and exercised a decent restraint in pricing policies
were penalized by having their relatively low prices made into legal
ceilings. Less scrupulous competitors who either ignored or defied the
government's hesitant efforts to stabilize prices by voluntary means
profited by having their high prices accepted as the lawful maximums.
Buyers who abided by repeated promises that prices would soon be
11. U.S. PREsIDENT, THE EcoNomic REPoRT OF THE PRESIDENT 18-19 (Janu-
ary 1951).
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stabilized and then rolled back (either to pre-Korea levels or to October
15 levels or even to the levels which they had reached on December 15)
found themselves with short supplies in a rising market. Hoarders
and speculators, however, benefited enormously. At the last moment,
it seems, the government decided to have no price roll-backs of any
kind. Prior to that time Mr. DiSalle had been repeatedly quoted in the
daily press as favoring the principle of roll-backs. Yet with GCPR,
the legal maximum became the highest price at which any seller had
delivered his goods or services in a five week period which included the
Christmas rush and the climax of the post-Korea buying panic.
Who was responsible for that decision is no longer important.
What may be important is that future generations of price controllers,
if the breed survives in public service, had by this nearsighted and
cynical act been permanently deprived of any'moral basis for seeking
price restraint through appeals for voluntary self-limitation.
IV
The cost of the delay in establishing price and wage control was
very great. In human terms, hardest hit were the four million pen-
sioners under Social Security; nearly as many veterans drawing benefits
for retirement or disability; government workers-about 632 million
of them-in federal, state and local jobs; retired federal workers, re-
tired railroad workers, and their widows; investors in bonds, mortgages
and annuities; other fixed income groups; and most unorganized
workers.
To the government the cost could be measured in dollars, in price
tensions, in time, and in the loss of public confidence in its promises.
Before the Congress adjourns for the nominating conventions in the
summer of 1952 it will have appropriated a minimum of $150 billion
for post-Korea foreign aid, defense and rearmament. Price increases
since June 1950 have added about 20% to the military bill for weapons
and at least $20 billion to the cost of consumer goods and services in
1951 alone.12 Of very great importance, the leeway which existed in the
price structure (taut though it already was in January 1950)-the
leeway which permits some price increases, yet gives the government
time to think and act before the risk of dangerous inflation is confronted
-was unwisely dissipated in speculative excesses, leaving far less
elasticity and discretion for price policy in the event of war or worsened
international relations.
The failure to stabilize prices and wages in the last half of 1950
also cost months in terms of the defense program. We sold the oppor-
12. See testimony of Defense Secretary Lovett and Secretary of the Army Pace,
June 7, 1951, before the Sub-Committee of the Senate Committee on Appropriations.
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tunity to convert speedily to defense production for a windfall (of
civilian goods) and a shortfall (of military goods). We were be-
trayed into an easy prosperity when we should have been hard at work
mobilizing. The exact time lost cannot be measured, but the control-
ling forces are clear enough. What incentive was there for businessmen
to seek military orders, to convert to arms production, to comply with
the spirit of defense supply regulations, or to press the defense estab-
lishment to clarify the rearmament program, when the prices of civilian
goods-and profits-were soaring to unprecedented heights? How
much of the slippage in military production schedules, of which Mr.
Wilson speaks, 3 was due to the magnetic attraction of more profitable
operations elsewhere?
V
Within the government there were two reasons, explicitly stated
and more popular than others, for the reluctance to establish ceilings
over prices and wages. In the first months following Korea we were
told that the inflationary pressures likely to be generated by a small
defense program could almost certainly be managed by taxation and
other indirect controls. Early military successes and a brief halt in
the upward march of prices, before the Chinese intervention in force,
gave some early support to this view. Later, as prices nevertheless
rose because of military reversals and speculative and psychological
forces, it was suggested that action must be delayed for lack of a prop-
erly organized government agency to administer the controls. At a
much later stage an argument by way of afterthought crept in. Rising
prices and the postponement of controls, it was said, had stimulated
the production of civilian goods and services thus creating a large
"civilian reserve" which would be most useful when cut-backs were
required to speed defense production.1
4
13. DnmEcrOR OF DEFENSE MOBILIZATION, Tni=m QUARTERLY REPORT TO THE PRESI-
DENT 6 (October 1, 1951). The major semantic contributions of the present defense
emergency are the words "slippage" and "shortfall." They have apparently been
found helpful in describing the failure to meet established production schedules. I
have not tried to learn whether the words are of recent coinage or whether they
were first minted in World War II and are only now being widely circulated.
14. The argument is almost certainly fallacious. Given raw materials and no
government restrictions the production would have been forthcoming at existing
prices which, as the government itself stated in January 1950, were already high
enough to be generally profitable at a high level of activity. Equally important, the
price increases which occurred in the fall of 1950 largely benefited those industries
which competed most directly for materials required in the defense program and
which produced goods the demand for which could most readily be postponed. The
enormous quantities of television sets, radios, and most other consumer durables manu-
factured in the fall and winter of 1950 benefited neither the government nor those
industries, nor did they create the kind of "civilian reserve" which is useful in time of
emergency. The race for production resulted in grossly unbalanced inventories and
indfall profits to the detriment of the defense program.
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Underlying the main surface contentions, for most people, were
others which revealed deep uncertainties regarding the merit, the feas-
ibility and the political wisdom of seeking to establish emergency ceiling
controls in a defense economy. It was said that direct controls are
hard to administer and enforce; that they are rigid, tend to freeze price
relationships and narrow the choice of buyers. It was said that indirect
inflation controls-increased taxation and savings and limitations on
the extension of credit-interfere less with individual liberties than
direct controls, and preserve a wider area for individual choice and the
play of free market forces. There was widespread discussion of the
fact that, increased civilian production apart, measures designed to
siphon off and reduce the pressures of excess demand, particularly
taxation, are the only permanent cures for inflation; that price controls,
to a considerable degree, are merely palliatives. Some also felt that
since price and wage controls had been dropped by the government only
a few years earlier an administration which restored them might suffer
politically.
These observations had merit. But they still left a responsible
government with the obligation to decide whether indirect controls
alone could stabilize the economy and, if so, whether such controls
could be made effective fast enough to avoid a damaging inflation.
The greater political risk, moreover, was not the possible unpopularity
of controls but that uncontrolled price rises would cause serious harm
to large elements of the population.
The first major contention of those responsible for delaying direct
price action was that the foreseeable size of the defense program made
ceiling controls unnecessary. The contention was defective in that
the impact of mobilization on the country did not depend solely on
the size of the program. In part it depended on what people thought
and feared and how they reacted to the threat of another war; in part
on whether (as in World War II) increased production needed for
defense could be obtained by putting unused resources-unemployed
men and facilities-to work. In the fall of 1950 there were few idle
resources, so that any sizeable rearmament program was bound to
require cutbacks in normal peacetime production. Popular instincts,
too, were sounder than economic forecasts. Buyers were not persuaded
by a government policy which seemed to say that, for purposes of
economic mobilization, Korea was a minor police action which could
be supported by the overflow from our vast economic larder, but from
the viewpoint of international political relations it was a grave crisis
in world affairs which gave rise to the imminent danger of a third
world war. The people generally understood that in Korea the Soviet
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Union had deliberately resorted to war in the service of aggression;
that in Korea our country and its United Nations allies were defending
against Soviet military power scantily clad in satellite flags; that such
a war was a major war; that it could readily preface the final holocaust.
More than 100,000 casualties and much more than $100 billion now
prove that popular instincts were as right in the fall of 1950 as in the
summer of 1941 when in Washington only President Roosevelt, Mr.
Baruch and a handful of others were deeply committed to a vastly en-
larged defense program. Popular prevision undoubtedly hastened the
onset of serious inflationary pressures, but it was not myopic.
The second main defense of those who chose to temporize with
ceiling controls was the lack of staff and the difficulties of recruitment.
The defense fails because the shortage of personnel, like other shortages
in this period, was in large measure caused by and could have been
averted by government action.
Certainly controls over prices and wages would soon become
futile or intolerable without an adequately staffed agency to administer
them. It is also true that it is increasingly difficult to persuade men
of capacity to forego the independence and rewards of private life
for the diminishing satisfactions and the hazards of government em-
ployment. Yet in time of emergency public service is a duty; and,
as a people, we have never failed to respond to the bugle. This time,
although some listened, not even a whistle was heard.
While deliberately allying itself with and even encouraging hostile
attitudes toward price and wage controls, the government simultane-
ously sought to recruit men to plan-not to administer or enforce but
merely to plan-such controls if they should be needed. Veterans of
OPA were not expressly disqualified by reason of their experience
although businessmen and seasoned public officials were obviously, and
understandably, preferred for the more prominent posts. But to induce
responsible businessmen to abandon their work, leave their homes, and
enter government service, to draft paper plans for distasteful controls
for possible use in an emergency which might never arise-would have
required not persuasion but hypnotism.
When the President declared the existence of an emergency on
December 15, 1950, the parent agency for all economic stabilization
matters, ESA, had a total of 225 employees. Forty-five days after the
establishment of general price and wage controls the subsidiary price
agency alone, OPS, had 4158 employees and 90 offices throughout the
country. For this extraordinary accomplishment. great credit is due
Mr. DiSalle. The obvious lesson would seem to be that in emergency
the government must take the risk of necessary action; if it does, the
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personnel to administer the laws and regulations can be drafted from
private life, from enterprises subject to control, and from the ranks of
government itself. A collateral observation is that the government
gains little from joining its critics in stigmatizing controls on which
it may later be forced to rely.
VI
The alternative to the government's irresolute efforts lay in some
adaptation of the Baruch Plan. It is a plan for industrial mobilization
designed to prevent inflation by stopping it. In its stabilization aspects,
the Plan calls for a general ceiling over all prices, wages and other
elements of cost, as part of a broader program which makes maximum
use of taxes and other indirect controls. Inflation control, in turn,
is coupled with an encompassing system of priorities and allocations.
The critical stabilization element is the general ceiling which, unlike
taxes and other indirect controls, can be put into instant operation with
immediate effect when the need arises. 5
The strategy of price stabilization in the fall of 1950 seemed to
call for initial reliance on voluntary appeals, together with a request to
Congress for higher taxes and other indirect controls; ceiling price
and wage controls were to be used, if at all, only as a last resort.'6
What was needed instead were prompt measures to prevent unnecessary
price and wage increases until such time as programs for higher taxes,
increased savings and stringent credit controls could be enacted or
put into effect. The strategy failed because the order of necessary
action was reversed.
Can it be doubted that the country would have united behind
the Administration if it had stood for the following plan to prevent
inflation?
Step One: Immediately after Korea, the President
(a) declares the existence of an emergency, calls for a tem-
porary halt to price and wage increases, and clearly explains to
the country why this measure of voluntary restraint is essential;
15. See statement of Bernard M. Baruch, July 26, 1950, Hearings, supra note 1,
at 97-104.
16. The term "indirect," in the phrase "indirect controls," offers an interesting
problem in the meaning of words. To many people it seems to convey the notion
of "easy." The truth is that the so-called "indirect" controls are as direct as
"direct" controls and no less painful and burdensome. The basic difference has to do
with governmental machinery. Indirect controls are administered by the Federal
Reserve Board and the Bureau of Internal Revenue; price and wage controls require
a new government organization. But there is nothing "indirect" about the bite of the
individual income tax; it hurts.
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(b) orders the establishment of a uniform government pur-
chase and resale program for imported raw materials essential
to defense production and the beginning of negotiations for a
multi-lateral international allocation and price agreement program
for such commodities;
(c) creates an Economic Stabilization Agency to formulate
and issue voluntary standards for price and wage stabilization
and to arrange for the necessary minimum record keeping;
(d) transfers to ESA, on a temporary emergency basis, the
stabilization planning group of the National Security Resources
Board, and selected volunteers from other government depart-
ments and agencies who have either had experience in stabilization
work during the last war or who are otherwise familiar with price
and wage problems;
(e) sends a message to the Congress reporting what he has
done and asking authority to establish legally enforceable price
and wage ceilings and pay limited import subsidies as part of a
larger program of emergency legislation covering priorities and
allocations, as well as increased taxation and other indirect anti-
inflation measures.
Step Two: Immediately after the Congress has acted the ESA
(a) promulgates a temporary general price and wage ceiling
and promptly thereafter begins the work of adjusting it for long
term contracts, seasonal requirements and related factors and then
replacing the general ceiling with more enforceable regulations
tailored to the requirements of each industry, beginning with pro-
ducers and manufacturers, and
(b) formulates standards for relief and decontrol in harmony
with a defense economy in which stabilization is to be insured
by a balanced program of both direct and indirect controls.
The failure of price policy in the fall of 1950 was the failure to
recognize soon enough that in a defense economy under conditions of
high level employment indirect inflation controls are essential but
insufficient. To decry direct controls for the limited emergency of 1950
and to endorse them for an all-out war is' to assume that the forces
of inflation are responsive to descriptive adjectives. The fundamental
question in each case is not whether the emergency is absolute but
whether in the absence of direct controls the going economy can support
the required degree of mobilization, physically and psychologically,
without a dangerous rise in prices. To justify the reluctance to invoke
the controls by saying that it was hard to foretell when spiraling in-
flation might develop is to evade the critical point. The question is
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not one of timing but of function. There are some circumstances in
which only direct controls can be effective; there are some jobs that
indirect controls cannot do.
First: Indirect controls cannot cope with intense, temporary price
pressures which arise from psychological and speculative forces. Such
pressures readily develop in an economy characterized by high levels
of activity and a large volume of accumulated liquid assets.
The immediate post-Korean inflation was caused in large part by
the expectation of future price increases and shortages. The modest
program of indirect controls recommended and adopted did not stop
unwarranted price increases; indirect controls could not have stopped
them without subjecting the economy to strains and risks greater than
the inflation itself.
To have prevented the two waves of buying and price increases
which developed in the last half of 1950 would have taken tax rates
so high and credit controls so drastic that no free nation would con-
ceivably adopt them for defense or war. Even if enacted, controls of
such severity would have been hurtful and dangerous after the im-
mediate crisis had passed. The Federal Reserve Board can turn credit
controls on and off with reasonable celerity; but taxation, at least in the
present division of government power between the Congress and the
President, cannot be so administered.1
7
Those who urge that speculative excesses on particular commodi-
ties should be disregarded because offset by subsequent periods of
liquidation are misled. In business it is only partly true that what
goes up must come down. The enormous post-Korean price increases
in wool, rubber and similar commodities were almost all wiped out by
late 1951. But price peaks for industrial commodities (e.g., steel) are
not so easily cut down. Higher costs become lodged in the industrial
price structure and normally remain there even in the face of severely
declining demand. Wage rates are among the most rigid of these
elements. If wage rates are increased in periods of speculative demand
they become, for all practical purposes, part of the industry's permanent
cost structure. Only direct controls, which prevent speculative booms
from having their effect on prices, can avoid this problem. Moreover,
direct general price controls are essential to allay the fear of further
price increases which is the greatest stimulus to speculative buying.
17. A partial solution might lie in tax legislation which provides for increased
rates to become automatically effective at specified future dates. As a practical
political matter Congress could far more readily postpone unnecessary step-ups as
the effective dates approached than pass new tax bills as the danger of inflation be-
came clearer. See Hart, Problems i; Federal Finance, Current Business Studies,
November, 1951, p. 19 (Trade and Industry Law Institute).
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Second: Indirect controls cannot stop the wage-price spiral with-
out jeopardizing the objectives of the defense economy. Higher wage
rates won by organized labor in periods of full employment not only
raise costs-providing a justification or pretext, as the case may be,
for raising prices-but increase spending power and demand so that
higher sales prices can be exacted. Indirect controls diminish in-
flationary pressures not by limiting prices but by reducing demand;
sellers cannot raise prices when buyers withdraw from the market for
lack of spending power. Taxes, for example, take purchasing power
from consumers, and credit controls make it difficult for business-
men or consumers to buy goods except out of savings or current income.
Indirect controls thus stop the wage-price spiral by reducing the demand
for goods (reducing sales) to the point where employers cannot afford
to pay higher wage rates, and by reducing the demand for manpower
(reducing employment) to the point where union leaders and workers
will not risk strikes to get wage increases. Indirect controls break into
the wage-price spiral by reducing the total volume-and the total
profitability-of business operations.
Even if we had the Spartan political fortitude to use indirect con-
trols in this manner, exclusive reliance on them might be disastrous.
It would unquestionably involve a waste of resources through reduced
employment; it might well deny the inducements necessary for essen-
tial defense expansion.
Third: Indirect controls in the form of tax rates high enough to
restrain inflation create serious problems of taxpayer inequities, ad-
ministrative difficulties, and weakened incentives to business.
To a low-paid white collar worker who has received no wage in-
crease in the last year, a tax increase designed to control an inflation
that has already impoverished him is neither a public service nor a
source of relief. Following Korea the President called for a total tax
increase of $15 billion as part of a revenue and stabilization program
which would be supported both by direct controls and indirect controls
other than taxation. The Congress enacted about half of the recom-
mended tax program, and influential members of both the Senate and
the House have since warned that the tax limit, at least for a defense
economy, is in sight or has been reached. To have prevented the price
rises which began in the third quarter of 1950, without direct con-
trols, would have taken increased personal taxes of at least $14 billion
(the increase in the annual rate of consumer expenditures from the
second to the third quarter). Even this would probably not have
sufficed since some increased demand would have been financed by
savings and higher wages. The Congress in fact increased personal
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taxes not by $14 billion but by $6 billion. Contrary to those who
would rely exclusively on indirect controls, the political truth seems to
be that effective direct price and wage controls are needed to make
higher taxes possible. The logic of this may not be wholly clear but it
represents current political-and very human-realities.
As tax rates rise the pressure of powerful groups to obtain favored
treatment in the terms of the tax laws and in their administration be-
comes a major problem of government. These pressures are enor-
mously intensified when the government chooses to forego all reliance
on direct controls-as it did immediately after Korea-and look exclu-
sively to higher and higher levels of taxation to avert destructive
inflation. Favoritism, government by pressure groups, and corruption
are the inevitable by-products.
Reliance on taxes to hold prices down must confront an interesting
paradox: Since increased taxes reduce the amount of disposable income
they, therefore, reduce the demand-pull on prices. But since increased
income taxes are persistently viewed by businessmen as equivalent to
increased costs (which economically they are not) they tend to increase
the cost-push pressure on prices. Even if there is no increase in cur-
rent incomes, accumulated savings and liquid assets are available to
pay higher prices if the current psychology so dictates.
There is a final danger that tax rates high enough to restrain
inflation might seriously dull incentives to work and to assume business
risks. It is questionable whether increases of the magnitude sought by
the President would be high enough to make this danger significant.
But tax rates high enough to stabilize a war economy might very well
bring about this problem.
Fourth: Indirect controls cannot protect the government-and the
taxpayer-against hold-up prices for essential defense materials. As
military demands for weapons and supplies become imperative, prices
rise for metals, chemicals, machine tools and other strategic defense
items. This is true even in the unlikely event that taxes and credit
controls are so speedily applied and so immediately effective that they
not only stabilize but force down the prices of less essential and less
strategic commodities and thus prevent a rise in the general level of
prices.
Rising prices in turn encourage users to accumulate unnecessary
inventories, and sellers to withhold goods in order to obtain further
price advances. To enforce vitally needed supply and inventory con-
trols in the face of the expectation of exorbitant profits would be ex-
tremely difficult even in the midst of war. In a defense economy, in
practice, it would be impossible. Priority and allocation controls are
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simply means of managing and creating scarcities; they cannot be ad-
ministered effectively without the support of price and wage controls.
Is it wise, however, to limit price increases on essential defense
materials? Would not uncontrolled price rises on such items better
serve the public interest by providing powerful incentives to maximize
production, discourage non-essential consumption, and speed the search
for substitute materials? Some price increases, we know, do call forth
increased production. But without price ceilings sellers of essential
commodities in time of emergency can exact prices so high that they
far exceed any inducement to more production and merely represent
economic blackmail. Beyond some moderate point, price increases for
strategic commodities enrich the lucky producers and penalize those
who happen to be engaged in the production of other goods. The cost
of a small increment to defense production-which could in any event
be obtained by other means-thus becomes an explosive combination
of profiteering and distress.
The actual cost is even higher. Not only the price structure, but
the wage structure is distorted. Producers of essential items, if prices
remain uncontrolled, are economically free to increase wages to attract
additional workers. Rising wage rates in strategic industries create
irresistible pressures for wage increases in the rest of the economy,
dragging the entire cost and price structure upward. Spiraling infla-
tion can then be averted only by ever rising tax rates and stronger credit
controls, creating more and more unemployment.'
VII
Quite simply, Mr. Baruch was right. However, now that power
to control prices and wages exists and has been exercised, are we also
equipped with the kinds of standards and policies which will enable
us to endure the long and restless twilight period of no all-out war but
no peace? How does this mischievous defense economy differ from the
economy of war?
It differs first in objectives. We are not mobilizing totally but
partially, and we have two main objectives: to create as soon as pos-
sible sufficient military strength to deter any potential aggressor, par-
ticularly the Soviet Union; and to build a base of economic strength and
mobilized resources on which, if war should come, a massive total
effort could quickly be mounted. We seek to restore our military
18. For portions of the analysis in this section I am particularly indebted to a
speech by Mr. Gardner Ackley, Economic Adviser, OPS, before the Toledo Bar
Association, October 19, 1951.
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productive capacity while maintaining a substantial part of our civilian
industry in operation.Y
9
It differs also in pace. The peak of the present mobilization
program will not be reached before 1953, and it may be delayed beyond
that. By late 1951 we had trebled the rate of our pre-Korean military
outlays and were spending for defense at an annual rate of more than
$40 billion. This rate was scheduled to rise to $50 billion by early
1952 and to $60 or $65 billion by the fall of that year. The increase
is from about 13% of our national product in late 1951 to about 20%
at the anticipated peak. This compares with 45%o of our total output
taken by the military at the height of World War IL
The pace of mobilization, although rapid, is further distinguish-
able from a war effort in that it is designed to be sustainable over a
long period of time. A defense economy has no clearly foreseeable
end. We are not trying to defeat an enemy in the field, but to re-
establish and maintain a military power balance with a permanently
hostile dictatorship. The graphic profile of the present defense pro-
gram is sometimes described as a hump-a rise to a rounded peak
followed by a downturn to a level somewhat below the highest point
of the curve, at which it flattens out. After the hump is passed, it is
often said, we shall settle down, indefinitely, to a plateau of defense
expenditure, estimated at about 40 to 50 billion dollars annually. This
is optimistic; the hump is more likely to be succeeded not by a plateau
but by a gentle upward climb which will continue so long as Soviet
imperialist ambitions remain uncurbed. The Soviet response-which
at least we must match-will not remain static. And weapons of
modern war rapidly become obsolescent; they must be replaced, usually
at higher costs.
When heavy military outlays reflect not the short-term emer-
gency of war but a long-term program for defense, unique price prob-
lems are posed. For the effort which is total and brief we can tolerate
much more than for the effort which is partial and prolonged. In
war, the future is hostage to the present for the single goal is survival.
Defense, however, has no termination date. For this reason, we cannot
for long defer the maintenance and indeed the expansion of our pro-
ductive plant and equipment; we cannot for long permit our economy
to be weakened by failure to maintain and replace necessary consumer
goods; nor can we risk destroying the fertile source of our economic
growth by failing to encourage new ideas, new products, and the es-
tablishment of new business firms.
19. DIRECTOR OF DEFENSE M OBILIZATION, THIRD QUARTERLY REPORT TO THE
PRESIDENT (October 1, 1951), p. 3.
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In a war economy the price controllers have the support, by and
large, of a people committed to a fight for survival; in a defense economy
they must do without the binding spirit of national unity and strong
patriotic incentives to compliance. In World War II a balance of
interests was achieved among the great economic groups of our
economy; businessmen, workers and farmers-each made sacrifices rec-
ognizing that roughly equivalent sacrifices were required of all. Today,
there is not only continued concern with the maintenance of relative
economic positions, but there is no moratorium in the struggle of each
group to improve its economic position relative to the others.
When we failed to grasp the nettle of controls in the fall of 1950
we permitted the precarious balance established by the free market
to be upset, and thus far we have been unable to achieve another. In-
creased profits coupled with the growing strength of labor unions and
the sharp rivalry among union leaders will be stumbling blocks to the
restoration of any new balance. Inevitably, therefore, wage claims
will remain an important factor in keeping the cost-push pressure on
prices. These claims will be based primarily on higher living costs but,
varying from industry to industry, they will also rely on increased
workers' productivity and the growth of industry earnings. The gov-
ernment's proposal to force business to absorb increased wage (and
material) costs out of profits will not be easy to enforce, even for those
industries where the "industry earnings standard" can fairly be in-
voked."0 Unless the cost of living is stabilized, government wage
standards are far more likely to succumb to a tacit and powerful alliance
of business and union leaders than survive as arbiters in the public
interest of business and union differences.
In war the demand of the military largely controls the production
machine; in a more limited emergency the tastes and desires of civ-
ilians remain highly important. Today more'than four-fifths of our
production is being used by civilians.
20. ERIc JOHNSTON, ESA ADmINIsTRAroR, STRONG DOLLARS 23 (November 30,
1951). ". . . in addition to all other safeguards adopted by OPS against unwar-
ranted severity in the regulations, every industry should have a definite minimum
protection against fixed ceilings that would unduly impair its average profits position
as a result of cost increases.
"Consequently, the so-called industry earnings standard was developed to fit that
need for minimum protection to business. Under this standard, the prices in any
industry can on its application be increased whenever its average return on net worth
falls below 85 percent of the average for the three best years from 1946 through
1949-the base period then specified for the excess profits tax. The earnings standard
is not designed as a profit control. It is an assurance to business against ceiling
prices set too low to allow a fair and equitable return on operations." For a fuller
statement of Mr. Johnston's policy guide for cost absorption, given to the Office of
Price Stabilization on April 21, 1951, see DIRECTOR OP DEFENSE MoBrLZATION,
SECOND QUARTERLY REPORT TO THE PRESIENT 40-41 (July 1, 1951).
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The impact of war on the economy is general; the impact of de-
fense mobilization varied. Wage increases in a war economy are al-
most always reflected to some degree in ceiling price adjustments;
this is less true in a defense economy where profits are more dependent
on normal civilian business. Today prices of metals, chemicals and
machinery are pressing hard against ceiling controls; however, the
prices of some foods, most textiles, and many items of consumer dur-
able goods are below ceiling.
In war intense inflationary pressures develop and remain nearly
constant; in a defense economy the pressures vary. The reasons lie
in the nature of a partial mobilization. First, a defense economy is
marked by humps in the levels of spending. We expect to reach the
peak of our first hump in 1953; others may develop in years ahead as
changes occur in military techniques or in the nature of our potential
war needs. Second, in a defense economy inflationary pressures may
ease as increased civilian supply becomes available but suddenly grow
intense because of underlying explosive psychological factors. If it
should become necessary to break the stalemate in Korea by force;
if the communists should suddenly come to power in Iran; if Berlin
or Vienna should be seized or blockaded, or Yugoslavia invaded, who
can predict the resulting pressures on prices? In conditions of high
employment, widespread availability of liquid assets and full utilization
of resources, speculative booms based on the fear of war, the uncertainty
of supply, or the anticipation of inflation can create serious danger of
runaway prices. The collapse of such booms may be followed by periods
of inventory liquidation and depressed consumer demand. Third, the
inflationary pressures of a defense economy are altered as we rechannel
our resources from old into new patterns of production. Pressures on
certain prices become greater when we expand rapidly to meet specific
shortages than when we continue unchanged an existing pattern of
production.
VIII
There are some who recognize that direct controls are essential
in an economy organized for war but who believe that in a defense
economy the work of price stabilization can or should be done by in-
direct controls alone. The reasons why this is impossible with even a
moderate degree of economic security have already been stated. In-
direct controls are impotent to deal with panic forces; they give rise,
in their more intense forms, to corrosive problems of government ad-
ministration and weakened incentives to business; they cannot protect
the government against exorbitant prices for essential defense ma-
terials; and, most pertinently for the economy of today, they cannot
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stop the wage-price spiral without jeopardizing the objectives of the
defense economy.
Not only are indirect controls by their very nature incapable of
providing stability, but existing legal and political limitations on their
use in practice reduce even their theoretical effectiveness. We have
been warned by Congressional leaders that the political limit of taxa-
tion in a defense economy has very nearly been reached. Revenue laws
may be improved and loop-holes closed, but the basic structure of rates
is not likely to be revised upward, at any rate not in an election year
and not without great strain in any succeeding year since the burden of
future increases in taxation is almost certain to fall on lower and, to
a lesser degree, middle income groups. In extending the Defense
Production Act, moreover, the Congress imposed specific limitations
on the use of credit controls. Under the law as it stands today, the
government is denied adequate power to meet renewed consumer and
mortgage credit inflation if it should develop in the future."' Finally,
we have yet to take effective action to restrict non-essential spending
by business and government. This is true not because we are unable
to distinguish between the indispensable and the desirable in capital
formation, but because the government has thus far been unable to
muster the public support required to put such unpleasant decisions
into effect.
Indirect controls are essential to reduce the pressure of excess
demand on the market and, if the size of the defense program is rela-
tively small as compared with the total productive power of the econ-
omy, they may be sufficiently effective for limited periods to permit some
or all prices to be stabilized by the impersonal forces of the market.
But to place exclusive reliance on indirect controls and, in the midst of
mobilization, to abandon direct controls and dismantle the laboriously
constructed government apparatus required to administer them is surely
to invite catastrophe.
This does not mean, however, that comprehensive price controls
and hold-the-line price policies are equally appropriate in rearmament
and in war. Temporary emergencies may develop in a defense economy
which require the full use of the Government's authority over prices
and wages, and the mere existence of power in the Government will
help to prevent speculative and panic movements. But these are per-
suasive considerations for preserving the authority to control prices
and wages and using them as needed, not reasons for making a wartime
system of controls a fixture of the Nation's economy for an indefinite
period of time.
21. JOHNSTON, op. dt. mtpra note 20, at 14.
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At the end of 1951 some products in ample supply, under price
control, were selling well below their maximum price regulations. In
his final report Mr. Johnston, the ESA Administrator, stated that al-
though direct controls should be under constant review "to determine
when any or all of them can safely be removed," it was premature then
to recommend decontrol for these reasons:
"Severe limitations being placed through allocations authority
on the output of many consumer durables will inevitably exert
renewed price pressures in important areas of the economy.
"Shortages in hard goods, coupled with greater consumer
purchasing power, will be reflected in increased demands for items
now in ample supply at below-ceiling prices. No one is being
hurt by controls on products selling today below ceilings and we
have insurance to protect us against future inflationary blows." 22
So long as the defense program is not yet over the first hump,
these arguments have very substantial validity. Mr. Wilson has just
reported that in 1952 "The inflationary outlook is still dominated by
the continuing rise in defense expenditures." 23 Nevertheless the fact
remains that even now the inflationary danger is not equally great
for all items. The hard question is whether direct controls should be
maintained on products in demonstrably abundant supply.
In the making of public law and stabilization policy for a vigilance
economy there are few experts, for there has been little pertinent ex-
perience. The Government has only just begun to grapple with the
difficulties so that whoever speaks, particularly the private observer who
may be unaware of considerations which bind the official policymaker,
should speak with humility. As yet, beyond the obvious, only caution-
ary guidance is justified.
The free market system is certainly the most efficient and least
burdensome system yet devised for the distribution of our resources
and production; it should be fully and completely restored as soon as
our economic defenses are strong enough and our civilian supply situa-
tion warrants it. Since, characteristically, the inflationary pressures
of a defense economy are changeable, we must decide whether it is wise
or possible to develo the means to turn price controls on and off as
needed. If some prices are pushing against ceiling regulations and
others are fluctuating below them, must a system of comprehensive
controls be maintained or can we devise a secure plan of "triggered-
decontrol" ?
22. JoHNsTox, op. cit. supra note 20, at 25.
23. DntEcroR OF DEFENsE MOaILIZATIoN, FouRTu QUARTmELY REPORT TO THE
PRESiDENT 5 (January 1, 1952).
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In the initial effort to achieve stability, price control by broad
measures such as GCPR and the General Maximum Price Regula-
tion of OPA is essential to stop the upward thrust of all prices, to
restore public confidence, and to give the Government time in which
to put into effect the tailored regulations which both equity and defense-
type production patterns demand. In wartime a fully developed system
of controls may be necessary because heavy inflationary pressures oper-
ate continuously throughout the economy. In a more limited emer-
gency, at times, some ceilings will be left stranded at levels above the
free market prices. The Government then has the choice of leaving
the regulations at their existing levels as a form of insurance against
renewed price pressures, revising them downward as markets fall, or
ordering decontrol because free market forces are operating.
The indefinite preservation of umbrella ceilings against the pos-
sibility of future inflationary storms is an appealing metaphor but
probably bad policy. The levels of prices which are embodied in such
regulations, and their relationships to other prices, will have only the
most random bearing on the pattern of consumer or defense demand
which exists when the storm breaks. The overriding merit of the
Baruch ceiling is that it seizes and for a period preserves price levels
and relationships fixed by the demand requirements of a free market.
To rely on umbrella ceilings for possible future periods of stress, would
be to attempt to satisfy the needs of a later crisis by solutions devised
for an earlier one. To revise constantly so that ceiling regulations
chase prices rather than control them would seem to be unnecessary
rather than positively harmful. 'When prices are set by the forces of a
free market rather than the limitations of a ceiling, and this condition
is likely to continue, special justification is needed to warrant continued
regulation by direct controls. There may, of course, be some normally
stable prices so threatened that umbrella ceilings would be appropriate;
there may be others important and volatile enough to justify constant
revisions of the ceiling regulations. But the burden of proof in such
cases is on those who resist decontrol. If free market forces are operat-
ing and if the available supply appears to be adequate for a substantial
period ahead, the apparent solution in a defense economy, for industrial
prices, at least, is to order decontrol. The dangers, however, must be
reckoned with in each case.
One danger of selective decontrol is that as free markets grow
and become more profitable-and each decontrol order will intensify
the demand for others-they may consume abnormal quantities of
scarce goods and services to the detriment of essential civilian and
defense supply programs. More difficult to deal with is the possibility
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that price control for some and freedom for others may arouse the re-
sentment of those who are kept subject to controls. Whether a wide-
spread sense of grievance and injustice would in fact develop and
become a serious obstacle to a system of selective price controls is
partly a problem in social psychology and partly a question of how
the controls are administered. A related problem in equity is whether
labor would be willing to accept continued regulation of wages, assum-
ing the need existed, if important areas of prices were released from
controls. The answer would probably turn on what happened to the
cost-of-living and to business profits. If the cost-of-living were stabi-
lized the value of earnings would be preserved; but if business profits
increased substantially as a consequence of decontrol, labor leaders
would be quick to point out that the essential balance among major
economic groups was being destroyed. Nevertheless, in a defense
economy, price and wage stabilization should not be regarded as so
intertwined that both must be invoked if only one is needed. Rather,
they should be viewed as independent measures which require inde-
pendent justification. There is no need as yet to assume that labor will
demand de lure control of substantially all prices as a condition of con-
tinued acceptance of wage stabilization, when offered assurances of
de facto stability in living costs and profits. The first question is
whether the assurances can be given, not whether the offer would be
accepted.
In selecting the initial items and services for testing the possibilities
of decontrol, consideration should be given to those which least in-
fluence the cost of living, those which are unlikely to compete for
manpower and essential materials with other more important civilian
and defense items, and to those which are likely to remain in relatively
abundant supply. In the search for other criteria for decontrol we
might also consider the British example and release luxury or semi-
luxury products on which large excise or purchase taxes exist or
are imposed.
If decontrol is extended to all items, or essential defense items,
or items which are important in the cost of living, the price administra-
tor must then be equipped with a mechanism for recontrol. As yet
such a mechanism has not been devised. A possible approach might
be to maintain a skeleton staff obligated to keep the regulations in a
state of readiness should the need develop and directed to maintain
contact with a reserve corps of price experts available for active duty
on short notice. The idea is attractive but the administrative difficulties
appear to be almost insuperable. Yet dogmatic judgments should be
avoided. The proper course may be to decontrol non-essential items
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on a selective basis as their prices become clearly responsive to free
market forces, and then, in limited but more important areas, to ex-
periment with stand-by regulations and cadres of price experts to de-
termine whether conditional recruitment is possible and whether ade-
quate public and Congressional support can be obtained for a readiness
program of price controls.
To determine what prices should be controlled in a defense
economy is difficult, but to formulate lasting standards for setting the
levels of prices and for adjusting them is far more difficult. Frozen
prices in our country are intolerable for more than brief intervals.
Product alterations required by changing seasons, styles and materials,
as well as price adjustments offered as incentives or forced by increases
in uncontrolled costs (for example, foreign transportation, imports and
overtime labor) prevent price rigidity. Even our wartime stabiliza-
tion policy recognized the need for some increases and sought only
to limit the number of adjustments and to insure the maximum of
cost absorption.
For the crucial period of war, limited as it is in time, there is
no safe alternative, under a system of direct price and wage controls,
to a strict hold-the-line policy; the political and economic limitations
of taxation and other indirect controls, in any grave future emergency,
would be far too confining to be relied on as exclusive weapons against
the heavy inflationary pressures of all-out industrial mobilization. In
war, all prices are vulnerable and all price movements at least symbol-
ically significant; change, growth, and flexibility in production become
secondary to the over-riding need for economic stability, securely con-
trolled. For a defense economy of the present magnitude, however,
such an intractable, unyielding policy is unacceptable and may be harm-
ful. The maintenance, expansion and modernization of business fa-
cilities, financed by earnings, and the readiness to produce what people
want rather than what the profit incentives of frozen prices dictate, is
the long run foundation of our economic strength. In the present
limited emergency of unlimited duration, which we assume will divert
for defense a relatively small fraction of the Nation's product, this
foundation must be preserved. That it can be preserved without in-
sulating profits from every increase in the cost of labor or materials
is evident. The growth in productivity over the years has made pos-
sible a substantial advance in wages relative to prices while at the
same time insuring a satisfactory volume of profits. The present levels
of profits, partly the result of post-Korean price increases and partly
of a higher rate of business operations, insure the availability of a
cushion in most industries against the impact of reasonable wage
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demands. For new commodities and new sellers, however, special
consideration may be necessary. This will weaken the controls and
provide loopholes for the unscrupulous, but the alternative is to limit,
or deny, for an indefinite period, the opportunity for development and
change.
Although flexibility in the control of business prices is thus neces-
sary and desirable in a defense economy, there is danger that we may
be persuaded to accept the form of controls without insisting on their
substance. Cost absorption is the essential element of any system of
price control which purports to do more than validate rising prices.
Every system of price control involves the recognition of some cost
increases; more flexible systems involve the recognition of more cost
increases. The question is at what point flexibility-which in this
context merely means higher prices in response to higher costs-be-
comes legalized inflation.
In a persuasively written statement on price and wage controls
the Research and Policy Committee of the Committee for Economic
Development recently proposed a flexible system of direct controls,
under which business price ceilings could be recalculated every three
months to reflect increases or decreases in the costs of component goods
and services bought in some base period. Under this system each
seller would make his own recalculations on the basis of his own index
of costs for each of his products under control. If cost factors were
available on an industry-wide basis, the Government would announce
the adjustment factor and the seller would then recompute his ceiling
by applying the factor. In the case of standardized products, the
Government might itself announce the ceiling price quarterly.
The CED approach is responsible, and the entire statement should
be read by any student of the subject. To those who have seen price
control operations at first hand, however, a major difficulty, probably
a fatal defect, is evident. The system is substantially unenforceable.
The cooperation of buyers could not be enlisted in securing compliance
since legal prices would vary from seller to seller and would be re-
calculated by each seller, except in limited areas of standardized or
near standardized products. It is a fair prophecy that, under such
a system, there would be fewer such standardized products than now.
More important, the control agency, whose function is described as
"largely that of an auditor with enforcement powers," would be faced
with the gigantic task of recruiting and organizing as many thou-
sands of auditors as the Congress would authorize to be hired from
an already overburdened accounting profession. The CED correctly
recognizes that enforcement, under this system, would require expert
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accountants; their job would be to check, so long as controls are main-
tained, the innumerable and complex cost computations of several
million sellers of controlled commodities. This is apart from the very
great complexities of overhead allocation-which would be aggravated
by the decontrol of some products.
The Capehart Amendment, contained in Section 402(d) (4) of
the amended Defense Production Act, has properly been criticized for
its requirement that increases in "all" costs between Korea and July
26, 1951, shall be allowable in unit prices of manufactured and proc-
essed goods. It thus directs that the principle of cost absorption be
ignored for a thirteen month period. But the main difficulties with
the Amendment are administrative; there is no clear way of measuring
and allocating all costs to each unit of material, and there is no feasible
way in which the price control agency can check so complex a mass of
figures. The CED proposal is less arbitrary-it calls only for the
recognition, quarterly, of all "major" items of direct and indirect costs
-but it is unfortunately subject to many of the other objections leveled
against the Capehart Amendment.
Ix
The system of price and wage control in effect today, which the
CED program was designed to supersede, can hardly be described as
a closely geared, symmetrical product of economic engineering.24
In wage stabilization the cost of living is the basic guide
although limited increases are also permitted to correct inequities,
to operate merit systems, to establish health and welfare plans,
and as incentives for the recruitment of workers into defense
industries. Increases for the payment of pensions, and to com-
pensate workers for the growth in productivity are under con-
sideration.
In stabilizing farm prices parity is the determining factor;
prices below parity (or certain higher minimum 'standards) are
not subject to control.
Industrial prices are usually fixed on the basis of pre-Korea
unit prices adjusted for subsequent cost increases, with provisions
for relief (i) for an entire industry if profits fall below the in-
dustry earnings standard; (ii) for a particular product line if
profits on that line fall below the break-even point; (iii) for an
individual firm if it is in a loss position. Price increases may also
24. Director of Defense Mobilization, op. cit. .pra note 23, 37-44. See J. K.
Galbraith, "The Disequilibrium System," American Economic Review, Vol. 37, No.
3, June 1947, pp. 287-302. The reference to "disequilibrium" in the title to Mr. Gal-
braith's article refers to the excess of demand over supply which existed and was
nurtured in our economic organization during World War II.
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be granted if necessary to obtain increased production of essential
materials.
Distributors, under the Herlong Amendment (Section
402 (k) of the amended Defense Production Act), in all regula-
tions issued after the 1951 amendments, are guaranteed "their
customary percentage margins" on invoice costs regardless of
operating costs or profits.
In addition, most prices are subject to some pressures be-
cause not all costs are controlled; some prices may rise beyond
existing levels because of the Capehart Amendment; meat regu-
lations cannot lawfully be supported by the assignment of slaughter
quotas to insure that cattle marketings are kept within normal
channels.
Under this system of direct controls, assisted by some increased
taxation, limited credit controls, voluntary savings, and a strikingly
modest degree of curtailment of non-essential investments, wholesale
prices since the spring of 1951 have remained relatively stable, although
living costs have increased 2.6% since the issuance of GCPR. By
the pragmatic test, therefore, this curious patchwork program-which
in many essentials resembles the World War II program-has been
effective enough. For the time being, moreover, no major group in
the population seems to be so discontented with its members' share of
the Nation's production that it is seeking to destroy the precarious
balance which the system provides. If the wage-price problem in the
steel industry is settled within the framework of existing wage stand-
ards, and inflationary pressures do not substantially increase, the
mobilization program may pass the first hump without a great deal of
additional strain and with only a few refinements. If inflationary
pressures increase markedly, however, or if unhappily our defense
economy becomes a war economy, we shall almost certainly be obliged
to develop new and as yet untried solutions for the new problems.
In a time of all-out war some form of the Baruch Plan, with its
balanced emphasis on heavy taxation and other indirect controls, to-
gether with firm and comprehensive price, wage and other cost con-
trols, would undoubtedly become our first major economic defense line.
But one world war and one police action have left their mark in our
laws and in our habits. We have become too knowing in the ways of
avoiding unpleasant and difficult tasks. We have become too wise in
the ways of shifting economic burdens to others. Our statutes and
our stabilization policies are barnacled with special exceptions and
limitations. In the limited emergency, which so much resembles a
peacetime economy, these may be tolerated; for full mobilization or
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World War III they would have been cleaned away. We cannot
assume, we may only hope, that each of the major economic groups
would be willing at that time to give up what it has so laboriously won
in the inter-group competition for a greater share of the Nation's
product. We must be prepared, therefore, in the event that the re-
generation will not be complete: that taxes cannot be increased fast
enough; that credit controls cannot be strengthened soon enough; that
voluntary savings will not suffice to prevent the excess of demand over
supply which leads to spiraling inflation. It may then be necessary
to develop new techniques to reduce consumer demand as part of a
larger stabilization framework. Of these new techniques the most
hopeful appears to be a controlled savings program which would oblige
us to devote a part of our incomes, on some progressive scale, to the
purchase of Government securities. It may be desirable to exclude
from taxable income the sums required for savings; it may be wise,
beyond this, to tie the securities to the cost-of-living so as to guarantee
that the value of the savings will be preserved."
Mandatory savings, however, is only one possible alternative;
there may be others.2" What is clear now is that all of the alternatives
must be examined promptly and probably cannot support inflationary
pressures much beyond those which presently prevail.
25. Kooperativ Forbundet, the quasi-public Swedish Cooperative, has recently
offered a 20-year 3% bond issue which will be paid off at maturity at a rate to be
determined by the then existing price level, as measured by the cost-of-living indexes
compiled by the Swedish Board of Social Welfare. If held to maturity the bonds
in no case will be paid off at less than 100% of their face value, nor higher than
150%. The Wall-Street Journal, January 17, 1952. See also a series of four articles
entitled Agenda for the Age of Inflation, The Economist, Aug. 18, 25, Sep. 1, 8
(London).
26. A far more drastic approach to the problem of reducing excessive consumer
demand is expenditure rationing. This would place a ceiling on the total amount
which each consumer unit may spend during specified periods for consumer goods
and services. The consumer would retain discretion to decide what items to buy, so
long as his total purchases do not exceed his available funds. In their fully developed
form controls of this kind are so drastic that they cannot seriously be considered in
our country for crises much short of all-out atomic warfare. See ScrrovsKy, SHAW
and TARSHIS, MOBILIZING REsOURCES FOR WAR (1951).
